

**Workshop on Tax, Poverty and  
Finance for Development  
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**Devising Fair Rules for Multi-Level Games:  
Limitations of the OECD's  
Harmful Tax Practices Initiative**

**Prof. Sol Picciotto  
Lancaster University Law School**

# Recent Initiatives against Havens & OFCs

“globalization is creating new challenges in the field of tax policy. Tax schemes aimed at attracting financial and other geographically mobile activities can create harmful tax competition between States, carrying risks of distorting trade and investment and could lead to the erosion of national tax bases. We strongly urge the OECD to vigorously pursue its work in this field, aimed at establishing a multilateral approach under which countries could operate individually and collectively to limit the extent of these practices.”

G7 Summit Meeting, Lyon June 1996

# Loose Coordination

“We remain concerned about offshore financial centers and tax havens which undermine international standards of financial regulation and which are shelters to avoid or evade payment of tax. We strongly support the work being done by the FSF and the OECD's Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, as well as the cooperative efforts of the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) and the FATF. We urge the OECD's CFA to bring a rapid conclusion to its work on bank secrecy.”

G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors  
Tokyo, January 2000

# Emphasis on Information Exchange

We urge the OECD to give particular attention to the development of a comprehensive programme to improve the availability of information to tax authorities to curb international tax evasion and avoidance through tax havens, and through preferential tax regimes ...by the negotiation of effective information exchange arrangements. ...

In addition we encourage international action to enhance the capacity of anti- money laundering systems to deal effectively with tax related crimes. ... Money laundering authorities should be permitted to the greatest extent possible to pass information to their tax authorities to support the investigation of tax related crimes, and such information should be communicated to other jurisdictions in ways which would allow its use by their tax authorities. Such information should be used in a way which does not undermine the effectiveness of anti-money laundering systems.

G7 Summit, Birmingham, May 1999

# Fundamental Flaws

- Rich Country Initiative  
*G7-OECD policies, IMF-WB implementation*
- Targeting small states/jurisdictions  
*some (relatively) rich, some (mainly) poor*
- Imbalance - no reciprocity  
*small required to assist big states*
- No shared global welfare aims  
*national OECD country tax enforcement,  
not common effort e.g. against capital flight*
- No common drive against international tax avoidance  
*needs agreed principles to define & allocate tax base*

# Income/profits (direct) taxation

- Fairness/legitimacy  
*Proportionate, progressive*
- Prone to avoidance  
*'income' is an abstract concept  
income from capital especially indeterminate  
most effective by deduction at source (PAYE, interest, dividends)  
i.e. on employees, individual savers/pensioners*
- Avoidance (planning) strategies
  - (i) altering timing of payments;*
  - (ii) recharacterising nature of payments;*
  - (iii) changing the recipient.*

# Fair Taxation of International Investment Income

Home State

Residence/nationality

where recipient located


Capital-export equity

Host State

Source:

where income earned


Capital-import equity



# International Double Taxation

Taxing Residents on all income  
(residents in the territory)  
capital-export equity  
equal tax on investments at home/abroad

Taxing Income from All Sources  
(income earned in the territory)  
capital-import equity  
same taxes on all local business  
whoever the investor



**Juridical Double Taxation**  
same person's income taxed  
twice if earned abroad

**Economic Double Taxation**  
same income stream (intra-firm  
payments) taxed twice



## A Global Approach?

“In a business of this nature you cannot say how much is made in this country and how much in another. You kill an animal and the product of that animal is sold in 50 different countries. You cannot say how much is made in England and how much is made abroad. That is why I suggest that you should pay a turnover tax on what is brought into this country. ... It is not my object to escape payment of tax. My object is to get equality of taxation with the foreigner and nothing else.”

(Sir William Vestey, to Royal Commission on Taxation, 1915)

# Tax Treaties

## League of Nations: Finance Committee

studies 1923, 1925-27, conference 1928 - Model treaties for:

*Direct Taxes*

*Succession Duties*

*Administrative Assistance in Assessment*

*Assistance in Collection of Taxes*

Mexico drafts 1943, London 1946: single Direct Tax model treaty:

*Avoidance of Double Taxation [and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion]  
assistance >> exchange of information (article 26)*

UN: Commission (to 1954)  
Group of Experts 1968-2004  
Committee 2005-

OECD Fiscal Affairs Committee 1956-

Model Treaties + Commentaries + Reports

Network of Bilateral Tax Treaties > c.2, 200

Multilateral: Nordic, Andean

OECD/Council of Europe: *Mutual Administrative Assistance 1995*

## Tax Treaties' Allocation of Tax Jurisdiction

### Residence state

place of incorporation/  
centre of vital interests

### Business Profits - art.7

**subsidiary taxable by  
Host state**

### Associated Enterprises - art.9

profits = Arm's Length

### Foreign Investment Income

remittances from  
subsidiaries

dividends

interest on loans

fees and royalties

### Source State

income from immovable property

income attributable to a

Permanent Establishment (PE)

attributable = sales/other  
activities effected through PE

PE = fixed place of business, e.g.

branch, factory, office

mine, oil/gas well


?building site / oil rig

if > 6/12 months

# Basic Problems of Tax Treaty System


- Priority to Residence State of Investor
- Based on Portfolio Model of Investment
  - Associated enterprises: separate taxation*
  - Transfer Pricing rules: Arm's Length*
- Little Basis for Joint Approach
  - Income as defined in each state's law*
- Limited Exchange of Information
  - information 'necessary' for carrying out the treaty*
  - (i.e. to prevent double taxation, or also avoidance?)*

# International Avoidance (Double Non-Taxation): 1. Residence deferral of Home taxes on unremitted income




## International Avoidance: 2. Source Taxes

intra-affiliate payments deductible as costs by operating company,  
paid to Conduit in treaty-haven



# International Avoidance: 3. Round-Tripping

Host country residents use 'offshore' entities as vehicles for domestic investment  
e.g. Mauritius-India



# Globalization & Tax Competition

Emergence of tax havens 1920s

*family wealth & business, e.g. Vestey's*

Postwar direct capital flows & finance

*exploitation of tax deferral on retained earnings by TNCs*

*current account convertibility 1958-*

*'offshore' banking & international capital markets*

*deposits in havens \$11b 1968, \$368b 1978*

Liberalization of investment flows & capital flight

*complete convertibility 1979-*

*1984 US & UK end WT on interest to non-resident portfolio investors*

*1988 German WT on interest abandoned*

Competition for investment

*103 states offer investment incentives by 1988*



# Types of Haven

## Base-Haven

no/low (income/profits) tax, OR  
exemption for non-residents, e.g. “International Business  
Company”

## Treaty-Haven

Tax treaty limiting Source state withholding allowing Conduit  
(no effective denial-of-benefits provisions)

## Secrecy

Bank records: no disclosure to (foreign) fisc  
fiduciary accounts - beneficial owner concealed  
company ownership - bearer shares, owners not registered  
company accounts: limited filings, not enforced  
professional-client confidentiality

*Any state may be a haven for another's taxes*

# Anti-Haven Measures (by OECD countries)

## Anti-Base Measures

*Controlled Foreign Corporation - CFC*

*'passive' income deemed that of owners in Residence state*

*CFC must be in 'low-tax' jurisdiction: what is 'low'?*

*definition of 'owners'?*

*definition of 'passive' income - no 'real' activity (Finance? Services?)*

## Anti-Conduit

*denial of treaty benefits if recipient not bona fide resident*

*need for cooperation from Conduit state*

*denial of WT exemption to payments*

*e.g. interest re-categorised as dividend if subsidiary thinly capitalised*

*Regulated Investment Companies?*

## Information Exchange

*Treaty-partner should obtain information even if not needed for itself:*

*i.e. help to collect another state's taxes*

*(only accepted by all OECD in 2005)*

# Harmful Tax Practices

- Harmful Tax Practices 1998 Report: Haven criteria:
  - No/nominal taxation (low effective tax rate)*
    - tax holidays; exemption of foreign source income?
  - Lack of transparency*
    - secret rulings, negotiated tax privileges
  - Lack of (effective) exchange of information*
    - only information already obtained for its own enforcement?
  - No Substantial Activities / Ring-Fencing*
    - now dropped?
- Action:
  - listing & commitments: now 33 cooperative, 5 non-coop*
    - coordinated defensive measures?*
- Parity of treatment?
  - with OECD (Switzerland, US, etc), others (Singapore, Dubai)*
    - Global Forum, Towards a Level Playing Field*

## `Effective' Information Exchange?

- Not (yet) automatic  
*EC Interest Directive: only individuals, WT alternative  
OECD optional; automation still pending (STF agreed 1997)  
US: reporting of payments to non-residents only in 16 states*
- Extension of scope slow  
*needs (i) obligation to obtain, (ii) override secrecy  
OECD Model TIEA 2002, Revised art.26 OECD 2005, UN ?*
- Uneven Spread & Gaps  
*from Havens to OECD  
to developing countries? UN Model: capacity problems  
Singapore, Dubai?*
- Secrecy Blocks  
*bank secrecy: Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg, etc  
information unavailable: bearer shares/securities (US)*

# Tax Avoidance & International Finance

- Secrecy still prevalent in OFCs  
*'level playing-field' campaign has stalled information exchange  
money-laundering reports unavailable to tax authorities  
IMF Surveillance does not include tax transparency*
- Competition to Attract Investment  
*deterred by ensuring non-residents are taxed  
even OECD countries exempt reporting of payments to NR: US*
- Competition to Host & Control Financial Services  
*'offshore' & 'onshore' FCs linked*

## A Truly Global Approach?

- A Global Transparency Standard for Finance

*TJN support for UN Code of Conduct*

*Multilateral Convention on Tax Cooperation?*

*Information sharing between AML/CTF and Tax authorities*

- Worldwide Taxation of International Business

*Unitary Assessment & Formula Apportionment*

*(e.g. US; EU proposals for CCTB)*

*agreement on definition of tax base, apportionment formula*

*(including income attributable to financial services)*

*tax rates and collection still national*